Arab countries have reasons to want Erdogan to remain in power in Turkey

Of the dozens of political relations that carry the arbitrariness of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the relations with the Gulf countries are at a unique point. Under Erdogan, Turkey has managed a difficult competition and subsequent cooperation with the United Arab Emirates, a historically significant change in the relationship with Saudi Arabia (which has been strained in recent years and only recently returned to a positive trajectory), and an ever-growing relationship strategic orientation with Qatar. As Batu Joskun writes at The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, Turkey’s expanding multifaceted engagement with the Gulf—a product of the initially shared economic dynamism between the two regions, in addition to Erdogan’s personalized foreign policy style with key Gulf leaders – may have its stake in Turkey’s presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for June 2023.

With the country’s economic woes escalating and Erdogan’s growing unpopularity, Turkey’s opposition is gaining ground as it seeks to gain control of the government in upcoming elections. As the country experiences rising currents of nationalism, xenophobia and anti-Arab sentiment, the opposition has pledged to review Turkey’s relationship with the Gulf.

Kemal Kilicdaroglu, chairman of the main opposition Republican People’s Party and a possible presidential candidate as the joint opposition spokesman, has vowed to reopen the investigation into the killing of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi if he takes office. He was similarly critical of Erdogan’s efforts to engage with Abu Dhabi, calling him a “beggar” in search of funds to finance his re-election. In relations with Qatar, the Republican People’s Party has a long history of accusing the government of acquiescing in Qatar’s purchases of strategically important Turkish assets.

Kilicdaroglu was largely skeptical of the government’s attempt to restore ties with both the UAE and Saudi Arabia. His party questioned the nature of the approaches, accusing the government of giving up previously held positions for financial gain and tarnishing Turkey’s prestige. Turkey’s opposition sees the process as transactional, aimed at benefiting Erdogan’s re-election campaign, rather than part of a perceived foreign relations strategy.

Anti-Arabism

Coupled with growing anti-Arab sentiment, in part due to the growing visibility of Syrian refugees and worsening local economic conditions, the opposition has combined a Gulf-skeptic worldview with the population’s overwhelming dislike of immigrants, making claims that the Turks will soon become a minority in their own country. Immigrants and Gulf Arab tourists are increasingly confused with each other, as both are seen as threats to the preservation of “Turkishness”, particularly in popular areas such as Istanbul and the Black Sea, which have seen renewed interest with the end of the pandemic restrictions. Such xenophobic sentiments, initially channeled by fringe political movements, are gaining traction among the population, to the extent that they help shape the political agenda of the Republican People’s Party and other opposition parties.

Furthermore, the collective “Arab” was often the great other in Turkish nationalist perception. This prejudice is reinforced by the country’s formerly secular elites – whose discourse has often described the Arab world as backward and deeply conservative. The Republican People’s Party largely views Turkey’s immediate geographic neighborhood as an area best avoided and only engaged in when necessary. He sees relations with the Middle East as unnecessary, which could have implications for Turkey’s policy in the region if the party’s candidate, Kilicdaroglu, beats Erdogan in the upcoming presidential election.

What could change?

Strengthened relations with the Gulf were largely the product of Erdogan’s personal efforts – in contrast to Turkey’s longstanding relationship with the West, which is bound by institutional frameworks that often supersede domestic politics. Erdogan has guided Turkey’s Gulf policy – ​​competition with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia as well as recent overtures. An opposition-led government could thus easily change the course of relations, as there is little institutional framework, apart from strong trade ties, that could prevent such decisions. At the very least, a new government in Turkey could trigger a process of disengagement, which could lead to the loss of much of the growing relationship between the two sides.

While reopening the Khashoggi case would be legally impossible as it has been closed and transferred to the Saudi courts, such an attempt could bolster support for a Kilicdaroglu government to break with Erdogan’s foreign policy. Such a decision could also find support among Erdogan’s former allies, as the transfer of the Khashoggi case is said to have created rifts within the ruling party itself. Former Erdogan loyalists turned opposition figures – such as former prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu – also expressed similar sentiments about re-prosecuting the Saudi agents who killed Khashoggi. Such a course of action, whether it overcomes the legal hurdles in reality or not, could create yet another huge rift between Ankara and Riyadh.

Relations with the UAE appear less contentious and therefore less prone to risk, largely due to the concerted effort by Erdogan and Mohammed bin Zayed to overcome their rivalry. However, the UAE is also a common feature of Turkish domestic political discourse, with earlier claims by Erdogan loyalists that Abu Dhabi was complicit in the failed 2016 coup attempt now finding increasing traction in the ranks of the Republican People’s Party. Kilicdaroglu could therefore revisit such claims at the leadership level if elected president. In addition, the UAE’s desire to get involved in strategically important sectors of the Turkish economy, such as drone production, could also exacerbate tensions. Kilicdaroglu has already stated that his government will not honor any defense contract that Abu Dhabi is negotiating with Erdogan.

Turkey’s strategically oriented relationship with Qatar is perhaps the relationship that will suffer the most from Erdogan’s possible election defeat. An opposition government would be unwilling to continue Turkey’s military presence in Qatar, and the operation could be scaled back or stopped altogether. Opposition MPs had initially opposed Turkey’s troop deployment to Qatar in 2017 and continued to question the reasons for setting up the military base. Moreover, strong cooperation on regional issues and joint strategic calculations could bog down due to a lack of executive will in the new Turkish government, as such ties are currently a product of the close relationship between Erdogan and the emir of Qatar. In the event of a change of government in Turkey, they could probably find that the new president, whose cadres will replace Erdogan’s in the civil service, will show little interest in continuing that relationship.

More broadly, by acquiescing to – and helping to fuel – populist sentiment, an opposition government could review Turkey’s visa policies and the sale of real estate to foreigners – two issues that are increasingly controversial due to rising xenophobic sentiment in the country. country. Investigations could be launched into the sale of property to Gulf nationals and visa privileges could be revoked. This in turn would require a response from the Gulf capitals, possibly damaging ties and reducing the scale of tourism.

After a year of reconciliation efforts between Ankara and the Gulf capitals, the upcoming elections threaten to cast a shadow over these newly restored relations. If Erdogan does indeed lose in the upcoming elections, the politicization of Gulf relations in the Turkish domestic context will severely test the claim that foreign affairs can survive the destruction caused by populist politics.

Petros Kranias

Source: Capital

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