Germany: The crisis in Ukraine divides the ruling coalition

“Germany has a Russian problem,” writes Der Spiegel, blaming Chancellor Olaf Solz for failing to form a common position within his government on the crisis with Ukraine. At the same time, Friedrich Mertz, shortly after his election to the leadership of the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), accused his opponent of a “leadership deficit”, as, as he said, he has not yet visited Washington and Moscow, but is “concerned about Germany for a possible war in Ukraine “.

Following the issue of compulsory vaccination, the crisis on the Ukrainian border has revealed that the three ruling parties are indeed finding it difficult to reach consensus and present a united front.

Spiegel reveals today that US President Joe Biden has invited Olaf Soltz to Washington, but the latter has invoked commitments and now the two sides are looking for an appropriate date, which does not appear in the coming weeks.

A few days ago, it became known that William Burns, the head of the CIA, had passed through the door of the Chancellery for talks with Mr. Soltz, his chief of staff, Wolfgang Schmidt, and the head of the German secret services, Bruno Kral. According to Spiegel, the US official told his interlocutors directly that if Russia attacks Ukraine, the pressure on Berlin will increase in order to take a clear stance towards Moscow.

At a time when Western military and intelligence services are realizing the danger of a Russian attack on Ukraine, Berlin is opting for more “round” wording, vaguely talking about “political, economic and strategic consequences.” However, he rejects Russia’s expulsion from the international SWIFT payment system, as doing so would hurt the German economy, something the new CDU leader has even argued. Deputy Chancellor and Minister of Economy and Climate Policy Robert Habeck, whose ministry will be responsible for possible sanctions against Russia, described the SWIFT blockade as “an absolute economic sanction”, noting that it would hit Russia hard. , but also Germany, as it would suspend all payments between Russian and German companies. These include corporate loans to banks in the two countries and possible losses in energy supply, as payments are also made through SWIFT. Indicatively, Russia met 55% of Germany’s gas needs in 2020 and it is not certain that alternatives could be found in such a short time. Mr Habek also suggested giving priority to new forms of economic co-operation, with a view to hydrogen and wind energy, and told Spiegel that “Moscow has a lot to lose by going to war, but it has a lot to gain if it withdraws its forces.” and de-escalate the tension. ”

However, there is also a clear division regarding the supply of weapons to Ukraine. Social Democrat Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht told the Welt am Sonntag that “this would not help at the moment” and referred to Germany’s generally restrictive policy on armaments.

In the Greens camp, Foreign Minister Alena Berbok remains adamantly opposed, while its co-chair Robert Hubbek has been calling for defense weapons to be sent to Ukraine since May. “I do not change my views depending on where I am,” Ms Burbok said during a recent visit to Ukraine. “I think it is difficult to deny Ukraine weapons of self-defense,” Habeck told German radio.

However, the Liberals (FDP) are not excluded from the problem either. The chairman of the Bundestag’s Defense Committee had just a few days ago referred to the position of the previous government, that “weapons are not delivered in crisis areas”, but now calls on the government to consider the possibility of deploying “defense weapons” in Ukraine.

As for Berlin’s general attitude towards Moscow, however, the most serious problem lies with the Chancellor’s own party. The left of the SPD still houses nostalgia for the past, which undoubtedly feels closer to Russia than to the West, and there are still many admirers of Willy Bradt’s famous Ostpolitik for “change through rapprochement.” The term has been appearing more and more frequently in public debate lately, suggesting some understanding of Moscow’s stance. Last week, SPD lawmaker Ralph Stegner protested the “offensive tone” used by many commentators on Russia, calling it “rhetorical intimidation” and “Cold War tone,” while SPD parliamentary group leader Rolf Mutsenchi SPD’s foreign policy chief Niels Schmidt has strongly opposed the arms shipment to Ukraine, saying it would be the first time since World War II that German weapons would be used against Russia.

SPD General Secretary Kevin Kunert provoked reactions within his party when he warned that “a possible international crisis should not be triggered by excessive rhetoric”, focusing mainly on the thorny issue of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. which was to bring Russian gas to Germany and which is opposed by the US, as well as the German Greens, has been completed since 2021, but its approval by the competent regulatory authorities is pending. Under pressure from his allies, Olaf Solz limited himself to saying that in the event of a Russian attack on Ukraine, all issues would be open, including energy. “The controversy over Nord Stream 2 and Russia’s attitude towards Ukraine should not be confused,” Kunert said.

The project was agreed upon by the government of Gerhard Schroeder, who later became chairman of the company that manages the pipeline and is currently chairman of Rosneft. In addition, Manuela Svessing, the Social Democrat prime minister of Mecklenburg-Pomerania, where the terminal is located on German soil, used Russian funding to set up an environmental foundation in the region.

On the other hand, however, is former Deputy Foreign Minister and current Chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee Michael Roth. Speaking to Spiegel, he called for the pipeline to be used as a bargaining chip against Moscow, essentially identical to the US position expressed last week in Berlin by Secretary of State Anthony Blinken. Mr Roth also called on the government to regulate trade with Russia and spoke of a “new European Ostpolitik”, which should also take into account the security concerns of Central European partners. “These interests are often despised by many Russian apologists. They like to call Russia a ‘neighbor’, as if Poland, Ukraine and the Baltic states do not exist,” said Michael Roth.

The Chancellor himself may not belong to the pro-Russian wing of the SPD, but he often states that Nord Stream 2 is a “purely economic venture”, without acknowledging its political dimensions.

Just two months after moving to the Chancellery, Olaf Solz is facing an additional crisis, in addition to the pandemic. His room for maneuver is hypothetically limited, as is the balance of his three-party government. Many of his choices, however, will be judged – especially Germany’s future position in Europe and in the world.