Mali: a coup d’état in the coup d’état?

In May 24, 2021, in the afternoon, the Malian president of the transition, Bah N’Daw, as well as his Prime Minister Moctar Ouane were arrested by elements of the Malian armed forces, then taken to the Soundiata Keïta military camp in Kati, this famous camp which has always been at the heart of all the coups d’état in Mali.

Some observers described the facts as a putsch, others as a simple discussion between the executive couple and the members of the “former” National Council for the Salvation of the People (CNSP), officially dissolved. Remember that Mali is going through an 18-month transition. This began with the coup d’état of August 18, 2020, which overthrew President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta. General elections are scheduled for early 2022, between February and March. The current situation seems to bring Mali back to the starting point; but what happened to get us there?

President N’Daw facing the colonels

On May 14, 2021, Prime Minister Moctar Ouane handed over the resignation of his government to President Bah N’Daw, who immediately returned him to his post, instructing him to start discussions with the political class, with a view to the formation of the next government. This approach was welcomed, because it restored the dialogue that had broken down between the new authorities and the political class since the coup d’état of August 18, 2020.

The first element that would immediately explain the current situation is that the resignation and reappointment of Mr. Ouane were personally managed by President N’Daw, without him consulting and reporting to those responsible for ” the ex ”-CNSP, namely Colonel Assimi Goita, vice-president of the transition; Colonel Malick Diaw, President of the National Transitional Council (the legislative body); Colonel Sadio Camara, Minister of Defense; Colonel-Major Ismaël Wagué, Minister of Reconciliation; and Colonel Modibo Koné, Minister of Security and Civil Protection.

Through this approach, President Bah N’Daw, who had been widely criticized for his erasure, thus gave the impression of finally taking back the reins of the transition and becoming its true master. One could already foresee that this development would not receive the assent, or even arouse the wrath of the putschist colonels, who could see in it the beginning of a process aimed at gradually extricating them from their positions.

A tense context

The popular fervor which accompanied the coup d’etat of August 18 faded very quickly. The junta, which initially embodied the long-awaited change, gradually emerged as an element of perpetuation of the system in place. No dignitary of the old regime was worried, including those against whom heavy accusations were made.

The May 14 cabinet reshuffle took place in an extremely tense socio-political context. The protest movement M5 – which denounces the conduct of the transition and calls for its “rectification”, as well as the dissolution of the National Transitional Council – had already scheduled a demonstration for June 4, 2021. In addition, after a 15 days notice, the trade union center of the National Union of Workers of Mali (UNTM) had started its second week in a row of strike, which was to continue until May 28, 2021. Given the political situation, and no ‘having no more interlocutor in the absence of a government, it suspended its strike slogan and called on its members to return to work from May 26, and until a return to normal.

The colonels of the “ex” -CNSP would have been aware of the list of the new government, published on May 24, 2021, at the same time as ordinary Malians, that is to say through the media. Their surprise was therefore to note the sidelining of two of theirs, namely the Minister of Defense Sadio Camara, and that of Security and Civil Protection Modibo Koné. Their reaction was not long in coming: barely an hour after the publication of the new composition of the government, the executive couple were arrested and taken manu militari to the Kati military camp.

The press release of the Vice-President, Colonel Goita, read on May 25, 2021 on national television (ORTM), could not be clearer: it denounces the attitude of the Prime Minister and the President, who formed the new government “without consultation with the vice-president”, namely himself. He adds :

“The vice-president saw himself under the obligation to act to preserve the transition charter and defend the Republic with a view to placing the president and the prime minister outside their prerogatives. ”

The vice-president therefore underlines here his attachment to the transition charter; however, this clearly stipulates his inability to replace the interim president if he is unable to attend. We remember that during the discussions around the adoption of the said charter, the post of vice-president (a first in Mali), specially created to be occupied by a member of the junta, had sometimes been seen as a way for this. last to anticipate the eventuality of leading the transition. It is for this reason that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) made the lifting of the sanctions against Mali conditional on the inclusion in the charter of a provision clearly stipulating that the vice-president cannot replace the president of the transition. It remains to be seen whether this is a temporary impediment or a permanent dismissal. In the second case, which seems to be the most likely, we would then be faced with a coup d’etat in the coup.

A key issue: convincing the population and obtaining the support of the M5

ECOWAS immediately dispatched to Mali, on May 25, its emissary in charge of monitoring the transition, former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan. The attitude of ECOWAS, and more generally of the international community (France, the United States and the UN through its Malian mission, the Minusma) will be decisive in the following events. The putschists know this and are now seeking to secure the support, in particular from the population and political actors, in particular from the M5, the protest movement which had weakened the power of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, and allowed the coup d’état. against the latter. Their approach is identical to the one they adopted during the coup d’état of August 18, 2020; but this time the arguments put forward are different.

Concerning the population, since the President and his Prime Minister are arrested, we are witnessing the formation of a certain opinion conveyed by the supporters of the junta suggesting that the current situation is the radical expression of a confrontation of points of divergent views between the executive couple and the colonels of the “ex” -CNSP. The first would obey only the interests of France – especially since the publication of the list of the new government comes barely 48 hours after the return of Bah N’Daw from Paris – while the second, them, would oppose imperialist France, instead promoting a rapprochement with Russia.

It is understandable that this is an argument that can weigh heavily on all those who take a dim view of the French military presence in Mali, and who regularly demonstrate against Operation Barkhane. These comments are relayed, as always, by activists on social networks and known for their anti-French positions.

A demonstration in support of the putschists had also been announced for May 25, on the Independence Square in Bamako, before being postponed to a later date. The objective for the junta would be to give the appearance of a form of popular assent to their coup; the only way in their eyes to hope to counter the international sanctions and pressures that are now coming.

Regarding the M5 movement, its leaders were invited to join the putschists in Kati just hours after the arrest of the President and the Prime Minister. For the military, it would be a question of offering the leaders of this movement the post of Prime Minister – a way of securing their support and, by the same token, of repairing the past “mistakes” made in their regard: although having been at the heart of the coup of August 18, 2020, the M5 ended up being totally excluded from the whole architecture of the transition (with the exception of a few of its members who were co-opted). In the same way, after the coup d’état of August 18, and before the establishment of the transition, the junta, eager to weigh in the face of an international community which demanded a civil transition, had made the M5 an ally, in promising its leaders that they would play an important role in the transition. M5 sympathizers were then largely in favor of a military transition.

What concrete reaction from the international community to a junta at bay?

The immediate analysis that can be made of this latest coup against the transitional president and his prime minister is that concern seems to have spread to the junta’s camp, due to its non-involvement in the formation of the junta. new government, and especially the sidelining of two of its members.

Beyond the simple loss of these ministerial posts, the situation could be perceived by the junta as the beginning of the process of its total and final exclusion from political affairs. It would also mean in a way for her the beginning of legal troubles, when we know that the Constitution of Mali makes the coup d’etat an imprescriptible crime.

President Bah N’Daw, by deciding to regain control of the political situation, probably received upstream support from ECOWAS, which “supervises” the transition, and also from Mali’s international partners, foremost among them France. It is now up to these different actors to intervene through strong actions, because they remain the only ones able to resolve the situation.