Opinion: Ukraine is actually making progress against Russia

Ukraine’s forces made very slow progress over the summer in a counteroffensive to liberate southern Ukraine from Russia’s clutches.

In August, officials in Washington began airing scathing complaints about Ukraine’s battlefield performance, while Ukraine’s supporters blamed long Western delays in delivering heavy equipment for giving Russia time to strengthen its defenses.

The slander, regrettable under any circumstances given the importance of a unified front, was particularly misguided given that Ukrainian troops had recently begun to gain momentum after weeks of intense fighting.

However, a chorus of actors laments that the summer’s disappointments show there is nothing more to do than cut off assistance to Ukraine, or at least threaten to do so to pressure Kiev to sue for peace.

The destruction brigade is absolutely consistent, having repeatedly predicted, wrongly, that Ukraine had no chance of resisting Russia’s invasion and subsequent summer and winter offensives, and that efforts to liberate Kherson province were practically futile.

Never mind that their proposed “solution” of trying to force Kiev to make territorial concessions to appease Russia is politically untenable for the Ukrainian public, with the leaders pledging to continue fighting regardless of the level of support they receive.

And never mind that a forced Ukrainian peace plan does not appear to be accompanied by any Kremlin overtures, likely resulting in more war later, just as the West’s failure to respond firmly to Russia’s 2014-2015 seizure of Crimea set the stage. for the invasion in 2022.

All this means that the West needs to plan for the possibility of the war lasting several years to maximize the chances of expelling Russia militarily or convincing Russian President Vladimir Putin that his waiting game is a failure.

Giving up after a lackluster summer would be a mistake, even if elements in the Republican Party are less supportive and the recent G20 summit hosted by India, which did not issue a statement reiterating the previous year’s explicit condemnation of the Russian invasion, underscored the challenge of international assistance beyond the West.

It is true that the Ukrainian counteroffensive began with obvious setbacks and did not advance as much as expected.

The Russian military corrected some mistakes in 2022, and when the newly trained and Western-equipped (but inexperienced) Ukrainian brigades launched the counteroffensive in June, they discovered that the Russian minefields were too dense and deep to be breached quickly enough using minefield vehicles. clearing mines before Russian drones, artillery and attack helicopters could detect and attack them.

Above all, Ukraine did not have enough vehicles to absorb the losses. But then Ukraine’s military quickly switched to the slower war of attrition it was accustomed to.

Engineers carefully cleared runways through vast minefields on foot. Meanwhile, Kiev’s troops used their artillery superiority, recently gained thanks to Western arms deliveries, to methodically destroy Russian batteries and manpower.

Ukrainian troops are able to advance an average of 700 to 1,200 meters every five days using these methods, according to a special report from the British Royal United Services Institute think tank.

As of September, the counteroffensive still has the potential to achieve important intermediate goals. Currently, Ukraine still has a few months before it risks running out of needed artillery shells, new combat units and time before the autumn mud makes other major offensive operations unfeasible, at least temporarily.

Ukraine’s slow progress partly reflects a risky Russian strategy of “defending forward” rather than leveraging the multiple layers of its defenses to push back. This denied Ukraine initially easier territorial gains, at the cost of heavier Russian losses.

But some analysts believe that Russia may finally be running out of units to hold the front line and that the deeper defensive lines are much less robustly defended than the lines that advance.

In August, Ukraine also finally mobilized elite brigades it had kept in reserve, hoping to break through Russian lines first. In a major battle for the small village of Robotyne, they overcame the Russian forces and then began outflanking east towards Verbove, which could help Ukraine open its way to important cities, including Tokmak and Melitopol.

At the same time, Russia’s ability to capture or recapture Ukrainian territory this winter appears limited, given the failures of its previous and wasted winter offensive, the losses suffered this summer, and the questionable leadership of Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and the Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov.

Thus, if Kiev can maintain its gains and avoid excessive losses and bomb expenses, it could continue moving slowly south toward Melitopol to cut the land bridge to Russia’s strategic bases and port in Crimea.

To be clear, Kiev’s desire to liberate territory is not a quixotic quest for national honor. Ukrainians in occupied communities have reportedly been subjected to torture, mutilation, sexual violence and execution, while thousands of children have been forcibly removed from their families and deported to Russia.

Furthermore, land previously confiscated by Russia has been used to strike ever deeper into Ukraine, making the restoration of defensible borders an existential concern.

To give Ukraine its best chance of liberating regions occupied by Russia since 2022, Washington and NATO need to come up with multi-year plans to sustain military assistance – primarily artillery and ammunition systems, followed by air defenses, drones and armored vehicles.

As the West’s reserves of easily donate equipment dry up, new large-scale production and procurement orders financed by the US and its allies are likely to be stepped up.

Western assistance, combined with Ukrainian courage, helped Kiev’s forces persevere in an exceptionally tough fight.

Following its donation of extra artillery to Ukraine, in July the Biden administration began crucial supplies to Ukraine from its large stockpiles of the controversial cluster artillery shells – a difficult decision, given that cluster bombs leave behind lasting dangers to be eliminated after battle.

But Kiev obtained the ammunition needed to sustain the counteroffensive for longer, pending the expansion of industrial production of conventional ammunition in 2024.

Meanwhile, Western armored vehicles drastically reduced soldier casualties in the stricken vehicles, while French and British cruise missiles carried out effective strikes against Russian command centers and ammunition depots as far away as Crimea.

Looking to the future, the US is expected to maintain deliveries of projectiles and rockets, as well as Bradley fighting vehicles (which were given a key role in Robotyne). And the battalion of 31 Abrams tanks that will soon arrive in Ukraine is expected to be followed by many more.

These tanks will come with depleted uranium munitions, but despite widespread claims to the contrary, several studies have not concluded that these pose any worse health risks than regular anti-tank shells. Washington should also consider contributing long-range missiles, such as the ATACMS missile, which the Biden administration, according to some sources, may be close to authorizing.

Then there is the issue of overcoming the endemic slowness in rebuilding Ukraine’s air force, despite commitments to finally supply Ukraine with F-16A jets. These are not miracle weapons, but a vital stepping stone to help Ukraine build a modern, Western-equipped air force.

NATO training must also improve in both quantity and quality, including intensive courses for senior Ukrainian commandos on planning the large, complex operations that Ukraine’s military struggles to execute.

Let there be no mistake – the war that comes next continues to be a horror. But by helping the Ukrainians liberate their territory, the US advances its own interests in defeating Russian aggression in Europe and demonstrating the high potential costs of wars of conquest that target US partners.

Putin miscalculated disastrously when he invaded Ukraine, so he now hopes to survive Western support for Ukraine to salvage what he can. Moscow’s elite particularly want to hold out until 2024, hoping that former President Donald Trump will return to office and cut aid, as opposition to support for Ukraine grows within the Republican Party.

But giving up in the face of manageable setbacks can be fatally self-defeating. During the American Civil War, General George McClellan ran against Lincoln on a platform that favored peace with the Confederacy—although the total surrender of the South at Appomattox occurred just a few months later.

Imagine how a successful McClellan “peace” plan could have inevitably led to more wars, indefensible oppression, and bloodshed.

The high cost of defeating Putin’s invasion is regrettable. But failing to do so now could mean that the US, Europe and Ukraine will pay a much higher price later.

*Editor’s Note: Sébastien Roblin writes about the technical, historical and political aspects of international security and conflicts. He holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and served in the Peace Corps in China. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author. See more opinions on CNN.