Reuters: How the Islamic State’s attack strategy changed after 2019

Nearly three years after the dissolution of his caliphate and the defeat of his forces in a battle on the Euphrates River, Islamic State fighters have launched guerrilla warfare from remote areas of Iraq and Syria.

In March 2019, after the battle of Baghuz, on the Syrian-Iraqi border, the IK was definitively defeated and ceased to control large areas in both countries.

Then the strategy of the Islamist organization changed, which from a powerful force that controlled the daily lives of millions of people, again became a group of rebels launching attacks from remote areas.

Leadership and structure

Following the death of IK founder Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in October 2019, the organization appointed Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Quraisi as its successor.

With the exception of Qurayshi, an Iraqi man arrested and detained by the United States, little is known about the IQ leadership, in part because it now operates secretly through autonomous local cells rather than through a central administration.

Sami Jassim, another Iraqi who was al-Baghdadi’s deputy and a close adviser to Qurayshi, was arrested last year by Iraqi authorities in northern Syria with the help of Turkey.

The U.S.-led coalition fighting the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) announced in mid-2019 that it had 14,000 to 18,000 members, including 3,000 foreigners. However, there are different estimates for the size of the organization.

Analysts point out that many local fighters have returned to their daily lives and are ready to take up arms again when given the opportunity.

“This organization has retained a significant number of fighters,” said Charles Lister of the Washington-based Middle East Institute. “It is almost impossible to estimate them accurately.”

Attacks

The IK fighters attacked a prison where jihadists were being held in the northeastern city of Hasaka about two weeks ago, in their largest operation since the dissolution of their caliphate.

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which controls the area, said 40 of its fighters, 77 guards and four civilians were killed, as well as 374 ISIS fighters and detainees.

Also in late January, ISIS attacked an Iraqi army base in Diyala, southeast of Baghdad, killing 11 soldiers.

In the meantime he has continued targeted killings, ambushes, suicide bombings and the placement of improvised explosive devices.

According to the latest report by the US government, the IK claimed responsibility for 182 attacks in Iraq and 19 in Syria over three months. Although the number was lower than in the past, the report notes that the organization is still able to launch deadly and complex operations.

“What we have seen in the last six to 12 months on both sides of the Syrian-Iraqi border is that IK nuclei are willing to launch more daring operations,” Lister said.

Fundamentals

The 11-year-old civil war in Syria and the unrest in Iraq following the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 provide fertile ground for IS fighters to recruit civilians who are outraged by political corruption, violence, insecurity and ethnic or religious divisions.

ISIS fighters have the opportunity to hide in Iraq in remote northern areas between those controlled by the central government and those controlled by the Kurds.

Areas in eastern Syria, beyond the control of the government, are also a stronghold of the Islamic State, while Kurdish forces ruling northeastern Syria do not have the necessary equipment to deal with any reorganization of the organization.

Future strategy?

The past of IK may give some information about his future plans.

Its predecessor, the Islamic State in Iraq, was largely defeated in 2007-2009 when the United States reinforced its troops and helped local fighters fight the jihadists.

The group went underground, expecting an increase in resentment among Sunnis in Iraq over the Shiite government in Baghdad. This in combination with the civil war in neighboring Syria offered the IC a new opportunity.

In 2012 and 2013, in a series of operations similar to the one launched in Hasaka, IS attacked prisons in western and southern Iraq and released hundreds of detainees, including prominent insurgents.

At the same time, using intimidation, blackmail and theft, he gained resources and power among the local population, preparing them for the moment when in 2014 he occupied Mosul and much of northern Iraq.