World

The ‘annexation’ of Belarus by Moscow went unnoticed

February 16, 2022
5:30 AM

By Craig Hooper

Vladimir Putin could leave Ukraine and nevertheless claim that he achieved a great European victory. With all eyes on Ukraine, the Russian president “advanced” on Belarus with 30,000 troops – and these Russian forces are unlikely to withdraw in the future.

Ukraine is “another” story. In the face of easy “union” with Belarus, Putin mobilized military forces that could not occupy the entire neighboring country if he decided to invade. Given the sanctions – and other unfortunate consequences – that Moscow would have in retaliation for its attack on Ukraine, a larger-scale military operation would make sense. With only 130,000 troops deployed on the border with Ukraine, the risk would be great and Putin would find it difficult to bend even the mediocre armed resistance in Kiev.

Putin has repeatedly tried to undermine democratic structures in Belarus and Ukraine. Unlike Belarus, Ukrainian civil society is made of “harder materials” and has so far always been able to stem the tide of Russian President George W. Bush. Political manipulation, corruption, and even gradual invasion have not forced Ukraine into significant concessions. In this Russian-Ukrainian crisis, after a few missteps and months of puzzle, Putin has only succeeded in rebuilding Ukraine’s “ragged” international reputation, with the international community rallying alongside the troubled Ukrainian nation.

In recent months, constant Russian pressure has forged Ukraine – too hard (albeit harder than Putin thought) to die. Today, for the first time, the international community is threatening Putin with paying a heavy price for assimilating a state that does not want to join its “Soviet Union.”

Prudence and economics suggest that Putin put Ukraine in second place and begin to officially “devour” Belarus, before anyone – except Poland and the Baltic states – wakes up and realizes what is happening. The postponement of the “Dissolve Ukraine” operation may be “hurting” at the moment, but Belarus, which is under Moscow control, is a consolation. Putin has no reason to rush – unless he has other states on the “menu”.

How “fragile” is Ukraine?

For more than a decade, Russia’s foreign policy toward its neighbors has been based on the hope that under constant pressure, “fragile” Ukraine will collapse. Putin is obsessed with this idea. The presence of the Russian army on the border with Ukraine, its preparations for a military operation, all this picture reflects Moscow’s assessment that Ukraine – discouraged by sudden, successive defeats on the battlefield or crushed by some violent demonstrations of Russian power – will be delivered quickly.

However, Putin has complicated the situation. Seeking even more pressure, he left open the size of a military operation against Ukraine and extended the period during which it would manifest itself. At the turning point of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, the cost of a less ambitious but safer military option – such as the official assimilation of Donbass or the “gnawing” of the Ukrainian border with the next step of annexing an area – could erase possible Russian profits. With the threat of sanctions looming in Moscow, a small-scale attack is probably not worth the fuss either. Russia should either take the big step, trying to seize what it can east of the Dnieper River with the insufficient – for the size of Ukraine – military forces it has gathered at the border (looking to the future for greater benefits), or withdraw fully her troops and try again when the perch has calmed down.

After accepting US warnings as another tool to weaken Ukraine’s strength, Putin was faced with a pressing timetable as Western sources leaked information that the Russian invasion would begin – today – on February 16. The West also assessed the outcome of a war based on different scenarios – including if the Russian offensive did not take place within the next few days and the Ukrainian capital was not captured within 24 hours – a performance reminiscent of the “Desert Storm” – its army Russia would look like a “hollow” war machine backed by online influencers despite its very willingness to fight.

A large-scale Russian attack aimed at occupying all the territories east of the Dnieper River is not a simple matter. Conquering all the territories east of the Dnieper would be a difficult task – but even more difficult would be to stop the Russian army in the Dnieper. Kiev stretches on both banks of the river, and the second largest nuclear power plant in Europe is also located on the river. If Ukraine were to defend its territories with the “scorched earth” tactic – where in its desperation it would use dams, nuclear power plants and other “dangerous” infrastructure as defensive barriers – Russia would have to go very deep into Ukrainian territory available limited logistical resources to support its military forces no matter how short the period of its military operations.

With Odessa and other “booty” to the west, the Dnieper would be a vast border. Creating a “Russian Ukraine” would be a chaotic endeavor. A hasty and fragmented Russian invasion would enable Ukraine to prepare for a guerrilla war, a version in which most European states could assist Kiev.

Can Putin leave as a winner?

The Russian president may even withdraw from the border with Ukraine, claiming that he achieved a significant victory. Belarus’ “annexation” is essentially complete. “Failure to meet the timing of a Western-sponsored Russian invasion gives Putin a chance to engage in a ‘fun’ rhetorical duel, trying to undermine the credibility of Western intelligence but also highlighting the West’s inability to recognize it.” Russia’s peaceful intentions. Inside the country, Putin could upgrade his credentials as a “reformer” and exploit mistakes and flaws in the development of forces on the border with Ukraine in order to decapitate enthusiastic supporters of his work who may still be present. in the ranks of the Russian army.

Maybe it’s too late for Putin to change course. Ukraine seems determined to oppose Russia. If the Russian president ordered an attack, Ukraine would resist – even if no one can figure out how to do it. Kiev would defend the besieged cities, destroy vital infrastructure and try to wage a conventional war. The refugees would flock to the west and the weapons to the east.

While the Russian president has masterfully – and with minimal effort – conquered Belarus, the Ukrainian crisis reveals the vulnerabilities of the spiritually aged Putin. For a long time, the mighty “emperor” only hears “yes” from his courtiers. If Ukraine goes awry for Putin, the Russian president risks losing the reputation of being a supernaturally flexible man who helped him prosper in post-Cold War Russia.

If Putin implements his Ukrainian “bluff” and it brings him to a dead end – at a time when his oligarchic friends will lose the assets they have hidden in Europe and America – his opponents will begin to tighten the noose around of. And a frightened Putin – “thirsty” for positive backwardness and legacy – will be even harder to deal with – inside and outside Russia.