The Montreux Treaty and the Importance of the Bosphorus Straits for the Russian Navy

Four days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 27, 2022, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoλουlu declared the operation a “war.” As he told CNN Türk, “Under these circumstances, we will implement the Montreux Agreement. Article 19 is quite clear. In the beginning, it was a Russian attack and we evaluated it with experts, soldiers and lawyers. Now it has turned into a war. “This is a military operation. It is officially a state of war.” The Turkish government has also tried to use the convention to defuse tensions in the Black Sea and, in general, has warned all countries not to send warships there – perhaps to limit the possibility of a naval escalation from the West.

According to Nicholas Meyers in an article for the Foreign Policy Research Institute, the application of Article 19 of the 1936 Montreux Convention could significantly affect the visibility of Russian forces in the Mediterranean if the restrictions last even a few weeks. Article 19 specifically regulates the passage of warships of the warring forces through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles – between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea – when Turkey is not taking part in the war. In the event of such a war, Turkey may legally prohibit the passage of “warships” belonging to the warships through the straits, with the exception of the right of return of these ships to their ports. As a result, Russian Black Sea Fleet warships currently deployed outside the Black Sea may return north via straits and non-Black Sea Fleet ships currently in the Pontus – such as the Baltic and Northern Fleet landing craft that arrived in early February – can depart. However, no further transport of Russian warships across the Straits would be allowed after that, during the war.

Russia’s access to the Mediterranean Sea and beyond has significantly influenced Russia’s strategy for almost all of its 325 years of Russian naval existence. The constantly testing and competing Russian-Turkish relations under the old imperial regimes prompted a growing desire in the late nineteenth century – first among intellectuals and finally among tsarist officials and diplomats – to annex the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles to Constantinople and Constantinople. “Tsarigrad”. During World War I, the Ottoman Empire closed the Straits of the Russian Empire, denying access to British and French trade and supplies – eventually forcing the Allies to reroute aid to Russia via the Arctic and Far East.

The Montreux Convention came after the imperial dispute over the straits at the end of World War I and the fact that Turkey managed to maintain control over them. After a century of doubt about Turkey’s ability to maintain the straits, the convention secured their custody by Turkey in international law. However, the convention also created several exceptions to the movement of Black Sea forces ships designed specifically to appease the Soviet Union. The convention makes every effort to allow Black Sea forces with ports outside the Black Sea to freely reposition warships – a benefit that could only be used by Turkey and the Soviet Union. In recent years, the Russian government has relied heavily on Turkey not to overturn the compromises stemming from the agreement.

Prior to the invasion of Ukraine, Russian Navy (VMF) ships they often crossed the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The vast majority of these crossings were carried out by ships of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, most often to relieve ships on patrol with the Russian Mediterranean Squadron or to bring supplies to Russian forces in Syria. Russian President Vladimir Putin founded the current Mediterranean Squadron in 2013, which operates from the Russian port facility in Tartu, Syria. Unlike other VMF units, the Mediterranean Squadron does not have permanently authorized ships, but instead manages and relies on ships developed by each of Russia’s four fleets. However, these are usually ships of the Black Sea Fleet at the beginning of the 2022 invasion, this fleet represented only five of the twelve Russian surface ships in the Mediterranean.

If Turkey keeps the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles closed to the Russian navy for a long time, the most immediate impact would be on these two missions to maintain a presence and provide business in both the Mediterranean and Syria. Russian fleets in the Baltic, North and Pacific Oceans will need to supply ships to the squad much more frequently than today. While this would require significantly longer supply lines and probably shorter stay times at the station, it would not be an insurmountable challenge for VMF. Indeed, during this time, cruise ships and other ships from both the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet are being deployed in the Mediterranean.

However, delivering supplies by sea to Russian forces in Syria may prove to be a greater challenge than previously thought. In addition to the reduced troop presence in Syria, the Russian presence in Tartu maintains supplies for the Mediterranean Squadron itself. These supplies are usually delivered by Black Sea Fleet landing craft that are now committed to staying in the Black Sea. This mission can be replaced by amphibious ships from other fleets, but the distances would be much longer. The distance between the main base of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol in the Crimea is only 1,095 nautical miles from the port of Tartu. By contrast, the main base of the Baltic Fleet in Baltiysk, in the Kaliningrad region, is about 4,200 nautical miles from Tartu; miles away. While Black Sea Fleet supply ships can cross between Sevastopol and Tartu in just four days, crossing the nearest Russian port outside the Black Sea to Kaliningrad would take more than a week. In the short term, moreover, almost all Russian amphibious vessels are deployed in the Black Sea to assist in the invasion of Ukraine.

Although almost 90% of the VMF exercises reported by the Russian Ministry of Defense between 2014 and 2021 took place in seas right next to Russian ports, more than 40% of the exercises reported in the distant seas took place in the Mediterranean. Fourteen of the thirty-two reported VMF port visits in 2021 were to the Mediterranean Sea, including members of NATO, Greece and Turkey and, in particular, Cyprus, a member of the European Union.

It is also important that the Black Sea Fleet is undoubtedly the most modernized of the Russian fleets in 2022. After almost twenty-five years of neglect during the period of Ukrainian control of Crimea and the various legal restrictions imposed on the recapitalization of aging ships in Sevastopol, the VMF has prioritized the replacement of obsolete capabilities in the Black Sea Fleet since the 2014 annexation. As a result, many new small Varshavyanka-class missile vessels and diesel submarines have been put into service in the Black Sea Fleet in recent years. Among the vessels participating in the exercise, in 2021 the average year in which a Black Sea Fleet vessel was put into operation was 1997 – with the exception of the Kommuna, a large rescue vessel from 1915) – compared to 1996 for the Baltic Fleet, in 1993 for the Northern Fleet and in 1982 for the Pacific Fleet. In addition to the appearance of the age of the VMF assets, these data show that a closed Bosphorus will keep the most modern Russian fleet confined to the sea of ​​its homeland.

Even a relatively short closure of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles at the VMF would therefore result in significantly increased logistics costs to maintain the key Russian presence of the last decade in the Mediterranean. If Turkey stays close for longer – such as until Ukrainian territory returns to full control of Kiev – it could raise serious questions about Russia’s ability to maintain its Mediterranean Squadron, given its strategic strategic priorities in the North. fleet and the Baltic and Pacific Fleets.

Petros Kranias