The Ukrainian crisis will trigger ‘shocks’ in nuclear arsenals

By Michael Krepon

In the past, Vladimir Putin has been cunning, but cautious. Today, everyone is worried about his moves, as he seems ready to abandon the cautious handling. Maybe his attitude is nothing more than a great show. In this case, the armies of the accomplices that the Russian “director” has placed in Belarus and along the border with Ukraine are an exaggeration. Putin may achieve far less than his maximalist demands and declare himself a winner without invading the neighboring country. It may, again, seek small territorial gains in eastern Ukraine. Even in this scenario, his military preparation is excessive.

However, the Russian president’s moves suggest greater ambitions – with Russian troops and tanks stationed near the Dnieper River: on the threshold of Kiev. Their departure may have meant removing pro-Western Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky from power and forming a new government that respects Putin’s wishes. The Russian president knows what could go wrong, but he feels deeply wronged and focuses on what could turn out well.

The way out of the crisis will open if Zelensky announces that Ukraine does not intend to join NATO within the next decade. Kiev may need more than 10 years to qualify for membership in the North Atlantic Alliance. After all, the latter has expanded beyond the limits of political and military cohesion it needs – a “break” from enlargement is entirely justified.

As the Ukrainian crisis unfolds, the consequences for the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the control of armaments will be negative. The worst case scenario is a “nuclear mushroom” conflict – but we are far from that scenario. However, even small-scale nuclear consequences are very unpleasant – and, at the same time, very likely.

The nuclear crisis will be averted for three reasons: First, Moscow is overwhelmingly superior to conventional weapons and therefore does not need to use nuclear weapons. Secondly, in the operational field, nuclear weapons are not the best for self-defense purposes, and, after all, Ukraine does not have a nuclear arsenal. Third, the United States will not fight on Ukrainian soil. Yes, Washington and other NATO capitals will assist the Ukrainians in defending their territories, but they are not prepared to fight for them. However, they will continue to support Ukraine by sending more military equipment.

Kiev has no nuclear weapons, as the Clinton administration helped Moscow regain what it left behind in Ukraine after the fall of the Soviet Union. In return, Ukraine received the support it needed to become a viable, independent state. The denuclearization of Ukraine – as well as Belarus and Kazakhstan – has helped prevent non-use of “light” nuclear weapons and the escalation of nuclear terrorism. It also paved the way for the indefinite validity of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

There are many inside and outside Ukraine who believe that the removal of nuclear weapons from Ukrainian territory was wrong. It is worth remembering, however, that at the time Kiev and Moscow were claiming control of these weapons, and the failure of the weaker Ukrainian forces to put them in their own arsenal could pose greater risks. In addition, Ukraine did not have the financial resources and know-how to maintain nuclear weapons or build the required level of security.

The new Ukrainian government needed Western economic and diplomatic assistance, and that support presupposed denuclearization. In return, Kiev received security assurances – but not unwavering guarantees – from Moscow, Washington and London.

That was in 1994. Five years later, Boris Yeltsin handed over power to Putin. In 2008, then-US President George W. Bush pushed NATO to admit Ukraine to the Alliance. In 2014, the Ukrainian people ousted a corrupt, pro-Russian leader. Putin then “burned the paper” with security assurances to Ukraine. He seized small pieces from eastern Ukraine and annexed Crimea. It is now ready to invade 1/3 of the country.

If Putin gives the green light for a large-scale attack on the neighboring country, the denuclearization of Ukraine will cause upheaval – especially between non-nuclear-weapon states that look to Washington for protection. There are, however, states that are rumored to be building an atomic bomb, but without realizing their threat. A more typical example, at present, is Iran. Most countries pursuing nuclear compensation policies have ties to the United States. These include Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Turkey. In addition, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan are closely monitoring developments in Ukraine.

Much depends on what Putin decides and what he gains or loses from his decision. If deterrent threats fall on deaf ears and Russian troops invade Ukraine, retaliation against Moscow must be severe. Otherwise, the message to other states will be that aggression secures profits, while denuclearization can be costly. The more benefits Putin gains, the greater the blow to nuclear non-proliferation and arms control. Compensation strategies will be intensified and bilateral arms control negotiations between Washington and Moscow will be “on ice.”

With the end of the Cold War, arms control achieved impressive results, enforcing a “nuclear peace”. The wrong decisions of George W. Bush, Putin and Donald Trump tore down much of this edifice. A Russian attack on Ukraine will make reconstruction even more difficult. And all this while Chinese President Xi Jinping, who has his own plans for Taiwan – at a time when China’s Olympic torchbearers include a Uighur whose compatriots are in “reform” camps, while maintaining battles on the disputed border with India – has not yet spoken.

Read also:

* What will be the cost for Russia if Nord Stream 2 is not approved and where will Europe turn to for gas?

* These are the “Kremlin oligarchs” targeted by the US with sanctions

* Putin’s economic “arsenal” to withstand a war in Ukraine

* How Putin Makes Billions: The Three Theories