West, Russia and Iran road race in the South Caucasus

By Kostas Raptis

On July 18, the head of Russia’s foreign intelligence services (SVR) Sergei Naryskin paid a visit to Armenia. The fact is remarkable in itself, all the more so because just three days earlier a similar visit to Yerevan had been made by Nicholas Burns, the first ever head of the CIA to move to the Caucasian republic.

Both dignitaries were received by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in the same room. For both, it was announced that the subject of the meeting with Pashinyan was “issues of international cooperation and regional and international security” as well as “the implementation of major joint projects”. Naryskin, however, commented that his visit was not related to that of his American counterpart, but he would not rule out the opposite being true.

Armenia, it is recalled, hosts a Russian base and is an ally of Russia, although a certain balancing was attempted during the days of the pro-Western Pasishian. But everything was overshadowed by the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020, where Armenian separatists (with Turkish intervention) suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of Azerbaijani forces and retained a smaller part of the territories they previously controlled only thanks to Moscow’s diplomatic intervention. which developed peacekeeping forces. Lately, efforts have been intensive, with the mediation of the West, to restore Armenia’s relations with Turkey and to open the borders between them – a move that has been announced for years, but has not been implemented.

But Armenia is not the only popular diplomatic destination lately. The same applies to Azerbaijan.

After Yerevan, Naryskin headed to Baku, where he co-signed with his Azeri counterpart an intelligence cooperation agreement aimed at fighting terrorism and protecting citizens of the two states in third countries.

The Russian foreign minister, again, had a telephone conversation with his Azeri counterpart on Wednesday in which international and regional issues were discussed, with the main one being the normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, on the basis of high-level tripartite agreements, mediated by Vladimir Putin , on November 9, 2020, January 11, 2021 and November 26 of the same year.

According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, the conversation between Sergei Lavrov and Dzheyhun Bayramov is part of the development of bilateral cooperation based on the (undisclosed) Allied Partnership Agreement, which they signed in Moscow on February 22, just two days before the Russian invasion. in Ukraine, Presidents Vladimir Putin and Ilham Aliyev.

It is a great paradox that Aliyev’s country, which cultivates this kind of relationship with Russia, is at the same time the West’s great hope for penetration into the Caspian Sea region (and from there into Central Asia), especially as a starting point for TAP pipeline, to free the European market from Russian natural gas.

Hence, on Monday the President of the Commission Ursula von der Leyen visited Baku, to sign an energy cooperation memorandum, while the following day Bairamov was in Brussels, where he not only met with the head of the EU’s foreign policy. Joseph Borel, on the occasion of the meeting of the EU-Azerbaijan Cooperation Council, but was also received outside the program by G.G. of NATO Jens Stoltenberg.

It is noted that on Saturday, the first meeting between the foreign ministers of Azerbaijan and Armenia after the 2020 war took place in Tbilisi, Georgia, based on the discussion of the mediating initiative of the president of the European Council, Charles Michel, who in April invited Pashinyan to Brussels and Aliyev. However, the situation remains tense, judging by reports from both sides of exchange of fire at the border.

It is obvious that Moscow wishes to have more control over what is happening in its Caucasian “backyard” and not to be overtaken by the diplomatic mobility developed by the EU and Turkey.

After all, the only two trips abroad made by Putin after February 24, this June in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan for the 6th Caspian Summit, with the participation of all littoral countries, and the one on Tuesday in Tehran for the tripartite summit meeting with his counterparts from Turkey and Iran, in the context of the “Astana Process” on the Syrian crisis, demonstrate the concentration of his interest in the region of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

The announcement of the creation of a Russia-India trade corridor through the Caspian and Iran, as well as Gazprom’s agreement to invest $40 billion in Iran’s energy sector, demonstrate the importance of tectonic changes in the region amid a new cold war. But none of these plans will materialize without aligning Azerbaijan to the plans of its neighbors.

On the other hand, the opening of the Turkey-Armenia corridor-Azerbaijan, welcomed by all concerned for primarily economic reasons, is of particular importance to the West in order to maintain geopolitical access to the Caspian Sea.

In this context, the Islamic Republic is also discovering the importance of the South Caucasus as a diplomatic destination. The secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Admiral Ali Shamkhani, visited Armenia on July 16 and then Azerbaijan, where he was received by Aliyev himself. As he later stated, the relations between the two countries are progressing, “without being affected by the pressure of third countries”.

It is recalled that the Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020 had caused rhetorical conflicts between Iran and Azerbaijan. The suspicion between the two sides, however, runs deeper, fueled mainly by the fact that Iran’s Azeri minority outnumbers the people of Azerbaijan. Moreover, it is an open secret that in the previous decade the Aliyev regime had especially developed its military relations with Israel, which was tempted by the idea of ​​airstrikes (and from the north) on the Iranian nuclear program.

At a time when international negotiations over Tehran’s nuclear program have reached an impasse, and the US and Israel have declared they are ready to take military action if Iran develops nuclear weapons, those old stories are becoming relevant again. Obviously, this is what Jens Stoltenberg thought when welcoming Bairamov.

Long a Persian and then Russian/Soviet territory, but considered Turkey’s “little sister”, Azerbaijan is emerging as one of the crucial pieces of the new cold war. But the decisive factor will be Aliyev’s balancing, cold realism, with the primary criterion being the perpetuation of his personal authority.