What do the ’27’ decisions mean for Ukraine?

By Costas Raptis

Most speak of a “historic moment”. But others see a “scary show of incompetence.” The first designation belongs to the President of the European Council Charles Michel and concerns the decision of the “27” to recognize the status of candidate country for accession in Ukraine, Moldova and next step in Georgia.

The cry of indignation, again, belongs to Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama, as his own European perspective has been dragged down by the stalemate between neighboring Northern Macedonia and Bulgaria, which is vetoing Skopje over the two sides. issues of language, history, common heritage and minorities.

In this respect, the European summit revealed a tangle of glaring contradictions. The “27” led to a decision regarding Ukraine and Moldova in which, as they acknowledge, they would not have proceeded under normal circumstances, but otherwise they still pretend that the conditions are normal and they can continue to indulge in their internal markets (Germany is already asking for an increase in the number of its MEPs in return), while they are addressing the candidate Member States with the well-known combination of austerity and consent.

Such e.g. This is the case in Georgia, where it has been pointed out that it needs to stick to the path of reform in order to “lock in” its candidacy. is not at war.

In the case of Ukraine, again, fast track candidacy means the abolition of all prerequisites and is nothing more than a political gesture to boost the morale of fighting Ukrainians – at a time when (and within the EU) the voices of those who believe in overthrow are growing. The situation that has arisen with the Russian invasion can not be achieved by military means and peace is urgent through negotiations and therefore compromises that are painful for the Ukrainian side.

The EU candidacy is a substitute for the impossibility of joining NATO, for the sake of which Ukraine has sunk into the war. But the EU candidacy neither wins nor stops wars. That is why it is possible: because it has no security implications like those answered by Russia at gunpoint.

But the “morale injection” will only work in the short term. Ukraine will inevitably find itself at the end of the line in which Albania and northern Macedonia are already – not to mention Turkey, which received accession talks at the Copenhagen Summit exactly twenty years ago.

In fact, Emanuel Macron did not miss the opportunity to reiterate his proposal, which was formulated precisely in response to the Ukrainian candidacy, for the formation of a European political union, distinct from the EU, which will answer the strategic question of maintaining neighbors in orbit (and post-treatment of the British divorce), without burdening the unification project.

German citizens, on the other hand, think lightly and this short-circuits them. According to opinion polls, supporters of Ukraine’s future accession to the EU estimated at 35%, those who are opposed. 45% also equate “yes” and “no” to the heavy weapons mission in Ukraine, while only 23% of Germans believe in a military victory for the Ukrainians.

Ironically, the Ukrainian crisis is returning to its original starting point, as the withdrawal in 2013 of then-Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych from the EU Association Agreement. which he had negotiated provoked the Maidan uprising and all the spectacular continuity. A sequel, which was primarily determined by the weakness of the EU. to monitor developments, from the Yanukovych peace withdrawal agreement mediated by the foreign ministers of Germany, France and Poland and lasting just 24 hours, to the Minsk Accords.