The mixture of strength and weakness of Erdogan

By Costas Raptis

In the twenty years that Turkey has been ruled by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the neighboring country has been a peculiar, perhaps uniquely global, combination of strength and weakness. A combination in which, in fact, the very elements that give strength to the neighboring country are those that exacerbate its weaknesses – as, for example, is the case with policies that have ensured high growth rates, while undermining monetary stability, or with the Middle Eastern adventures that reopened the Kurdish “pending” inside.

And vice versa: There is no crisis from which Turkey has not sought to profit – if necessary by multiplying the fronts and bidding on options that are facing international criticism, whether it is the economy or geopolitics. Because there are two rules that Tayyip Erdogan follows consistently: fleeing forward and reluctance to follow the “orthodox” recipes.

Guided by polarization

Many will argue that the result is nothing but becoming more and more powerful in an increasingly weakened country. But the Turkish president’s preference to feed polarization along dividing lines that shift as often as the choices of allies and rivals pays off over a period of twenty years, domestically and internationally. It would be difficult to abandon it now that Turkey is facing the greatest risks, not pure, but equally great opportunities.

But the “bet” has risen dramatically in recent days – as the war in Ukraine catalyzes the previously known framework, but also multiplies the financial costs for all players on the international chessboard. And Tayyip Erdogan, having closed many of his Middle East fronts in time (as his successor’s visit to Turkey scheduled for next week shows), is turning his gaze to the West, seeking to re-establish his relationship with the United States through triple blackmail.

The accounts with the West

The first part concerns the Turkish veto on Sweden and Finland joining NATO, which, despite the pious desires of analysts, has become more inflexible, as the Turkish leader now seeks written assurances from the candidate countries that they will abandon the “friendly terrorism “their choices. The fact that this veto is likely to be lifted, once the proper bargain is in place, does not diminish the blow to American prestige, since the lightning “Atlantic rally” against the “Russian threat” turned out to be painful and time-consuming.

The second part of the Turkish blackmail has to do with the threat of a new military operation in northern Syria against US-backed Kurdish separatists. This is a move indicative of the ease with which Ankara has now taken military action abroad, but also an emphatic reminder that the Syrian “pending” will by no means end in its absence – let alone the consolidation of a Kurdish existence. entity south of its borders.

The third and most impressive part is the spectacular upgrade of the threats against Greece, with the launch of the theory of “interconnection” of Greek sovereignty in the Aegean islands from the anticipation of their demilitarization.

All three sides complement each other, to the extent that they face the US and NATO with the possibility of losing all their credibility, unless they adapt to Turkish demands. At the same time, they highlight the Turkish game of balancing the West with Russia, as they facilitate Putin but also clash with the Russian line of defense of Syrian territorial integrity.

Election year amid severe bankruptcy

Erdogan’s acrobatics are further complicated by the fact that he runs the risk of losing control within the borders – politically and financially.

Just a year before the next election, opinion polls suggest the ruling party’s vote to be limited to 28%, while the new generation, which has seen no other power than Erdogan, is resolutely turning its back on Erdogan’s vision. his. In a country that is young enough, those under the age of 30 express more than 70% desire to emigrate, while the discomfort with the lack of financial prospects prevails even in the descendants of the ruling party executives.

Economy and foreign policy are increasingly intertwined, judging by the rhetoric Erdogan unleashed against the leadership of the TÜSİAD Industries Association, which has suggested that national interests are being pursued in matters such as the inclusion of Swansea. in NATO should change for the good of the economy and that the opinion of experts should have more weight in formulating economic policy.

The warnings from Babacan and S&P

The former “tsar” of the economy in previous Erdogan administrations and current leader of the opposition DEVA party, Ali Babacan, has publicly argued that Turkey is on the verge of bankruptcy and its credit rating is at an all-time low. He sounded the alarm, especially with regard to the country’s energy supply, and called for the restoration of the independence of the central bank and the statistical service.

Indeed, the pound has lost 23% of its exchange rate against the dollar this year, recording the worst performance among emerging market currencies, Turkish government bond risk premiums (CDS) have surpassed the levels of the 2008 crisis, 841 points on Monday, while inflation rose to 73.5% in May, marking an international “first”. However, Erdogan is not backing down from his unorthodox “developmentalist” views, with low interest rates centered on inflation.

For its part, S&P Global, in its Emerging Markets Report, described Turkey as the most exposed (along with Tunisia) international monetary easing in progress, as its banks’ reserves are largely deposited with the central bank. and could be committed.

It is in this environment of internal weakness and unrest that Erdogan is responding with increasing demonization and repression of dissenting voices, which are strangely called upon to spread Turkey’s ambitious and adventurous moves abroad.