What’s left of Willy Bradt’s Ostpolitik?

50 years after the ratification of the Agreements with Moscow and Warsaw, the emergence of historical memory raises the question for many, whether they prevented the war in Ukraine.

It was a dispute that left an era, opened wounds and became in a warlike atmosphere. “Never before has an issue disturbed the mood of our people so much, never before have the fronts of opinion been so diametrically opposed, so ruthless,” then-Foreign Minister Walter Cell said in a May plenary speech. On that day, however, the ruling Social Democrat-Liberal coalition under Willy Bradt ratified the Moscow and Warsaw Pacts. Fifty years have passed since then and the war in Ukraine has given rise to a debate over Brad’s famous Ostpolitik. Was it a groundbreaking achievement or the beginning of the disorientation of those who show understanding to the Russians within the Social Democratic Party?

The slogan then? Change through an approach devised by Brad’s advisor, Egon Barr. Or, as Walter Cell put it, “an attempt to move from confrontation to cooperation.” The phrase sounds familiar to us from the recent debate over Russia, but is the comparison relevant? “Looking back at Ostpolitik will not help us move forward these days on the issue of the war in Ukraine,” said historian Byrd Rother, a longtime fellow at the Willy Bradt Foundation. “One might wonder if Brad’s Ostpolitik can be implemented even today. Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, negotiations were one of the options, and many of them were held in Moscow as well. But the Russian attack on Ukraine created a completely a different situation, “Rotor points out.

Small steps, big questions

If we look at things closely enough, the initial framework in which Bradt sought closer cooperation with Moscow in the late 1960s differs significantly from post-Cold War Russian policy. Bradt’s most important motivation, who was also the local prime minister of Berlin, was to improve the daily life of the East and West Germans, who were separated by the Wall. The message; Small steps policy, such as the possibility of visits and transit transport. But for that to happen, Bradt had to deal with the big political questions that had remained unanswered since the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949. What will happen to East Germany, West Germany will recognize this “phenomenon to the east.” as then-Christian Democrat Chancellor Kurt Georg Kissinger called it? Would it recognize the post-war borders, that is, the territorial losses of World War II that Nazi Germany started? After all, were negotiations with communists allowed?

Bradt answered all these questions in the affirmative and thus set in motion a historic change of course. ” “The recently deceased historian Manfred Wilke summed up in a series of articles on Ostpolitik on behalf of the Federal Center for Political Education. The tangible results of this policy were the Agreement with the Soviet Union on 12 August 1970 and the Agreement with Poland on 7 December of the same year. Two amazing short texts of some articles. The central messages? Denial of violence, respect for the borders in force in Europe, including the Oder / Naise border, and abandonment of any territorial claims.

Her long arm Internship

Bradt had already paved the way for the new line as foreign minister in the grand coalition under Kissinger since 1966 and won the federal SPD election in 1969. But an internal political crisis erupted. Opposition leader Rainer Bartzel of the Christian Democrats rejected the two agreements for ratification in parliament on February 23, 1972, accusing them of “skillful propaganda”, “untrue allegations” and contempt for German interests. A 22-hour verbal war ensued. The SPD and the FDP still did not trust their own majority, but things took a different turn. Several government MPs reacted to the two agreements, left their parties and joined the opposition, the government lost the majority. Barcel took the opportunity and on April 24, 1972, attempted to be elected chancellor through a so-called constructive vote of no confidence (first introduced by Article 67 of the 1949 Constitution).

But he failed for inexplicable reasons at the time, by two votes. It was only decades later that it became known that Stasi, the infamous secret service of East Germany, had bribed Julius Steiner, a Christian Democrat MP, for 50,000 marks, and had listed the Christian Socialist Leo Wagner as an unofficial collaborator. Apparently Stasi had an interest in keeping Willy Bradt in power and thus saving the two conditions. Finally, exactly fifty years from today, Bradt passed their ratification with a parliamentary compromise. Almost all the deputies of the Christian Parties abstained during the voting, the result was marginal. Nevertheless, the policy of recession, for which Bradt received the Nobel Peace Prize, quickly became a point on which German foreign policy has long consented. It was continued by Chancellor Kohl after 1982. The fall of the Berlin Wall, German unification, the end of the Cold War, all referred to Ostpolitik and were an achievement of Bradt, who was honored by his party as a symbol.

Challenge of Ostpolitik

The situation changed after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Germany was much less dependent on Moscow’s bigotry and instead of being at the forefront of the controversy, it “sat” comfortably in the center of Europe. The historian Rother, who is close to the Social Democratic Party, says that after 1989 there was a new European order of peace. “Everything seemed to be going well in the 1990s, but in the late 2000s the Russia-West relationship became more confrontational. But the fact that Germany still wanted to stay in touch with Moscow, I do not see as immediate. “It was Germany and not just the SPD that relied on the negotiations with Russia.” But in terms of dependence on Russian energy, Germany has gone further than other EU countries. Europe on a large scale.

But it is also true that for a long time there was a broad consensus on these transactions including the Nord Stream pipeline, which was backed by former Chancellor Merkel. When the SPD is mainly criticized today for its overly pro-Russian stance, it is not only Chancellor Solz who is bothered. “There have been these distorted and slanderous descriptions of the SPD’s European and Russian policies since the Adenauer era, and that makes me angry,” Solz told Spiegel recently. It is clear that the party does not want Ostpolitik to be maligned. But the controversy has already begun. Party leader Lars Klingbail recently told the Welt on Sunday that “the Social Democratic Party’s program of principles says that security in Europe can only be achieved with Russia, but we see that this is not the case in the context of this war.” The foundations of the two agreements are shaking, perhaps as strongly as under Willie Bradt.

Verena Smith– Rosman /dpa

Edited by: Irini Anastassopoulou

Source: Deutsche Welle